More on Structure (its problems)

Is it really possible to have structure without order? I think so. The ideal social structure should be something like everyone having a place, sitting on a circle: all the places are equal distance from the center.

But let's read this analogy carefully:
1. What center? - what central doctrine(s) is one going to set up a structure with? And why that one?
2. What place? - why an essential (in the sense of essence) category? Haven't we done away with Being?
3. Why sitting? - do we really need conform to one certain social ideal?
4. Why static? - what about social fluidity?

These four questions are certainly valid, critical questions. There are generally two kinds of reactions to these questions:
i) one feels that the structure is ruined, and now one must look for a new one that would be able to suppress those questions.
ii) one feels annoyed and would like to re-enforce this structure no matter what; in other words, throw in the "so-what" question.

Both of these options are not healthy. I think there is a third option: one should engage these questions and try to come up with a justification for the structure which can withstand academic scrutiny. I am really beginning to think it is ultimately useless to deconstruct one idea after another without any ground. The first response throws away the rock ground in search of a diamond one; the second response insists on building on sand. One must offer a positive model, and then use our deconstructive tools to see if the model works for us. All buildings have foundation, but it must be a solid foundation. We have done enough deconstructionl; now we ought to construct.

Structure and Order

A friend, Raymond, independently asks me this question: what kind of feminist am I? I said that classifying is a dangerous act of power, because in classification (in the sense of ordering) one makes an arbitrary hierarchy, which makes many people vulnerable to needless oppression or subordination. (Well, I didn't say this exactly: this is at least what I intended to say.)

This is relevent to our discussion because, in his (since we do not have a gender neutral pronoun, I shall arbitrarily, without any reason other than the conventions of English, assume AC to be a "him": please don't take any offence in this) reading of Jee-Wah's defence, he points out the necessary need for classification: "You cannot deny that there are pretty, ugly, overweight, slim, young, and old people out there." Furthermore, "by not being aware of the differences that exist in this world, one is merely trying to blindfold oneself into thinking that 'everyone is equal and no one should categorize anyone to be thin or fat.'" I will not reject this correct fact. (Notice I did not use the word "truth"; "truth" for me is subjective; "correctness" is objectively verifiable, like definitions, sciences, mathematics.) However, there are two kinds of classifications: that of "structuring", and that of "ordering". They are similar, but in our context, profoundly different.

Classification as "structuring" means giving random data coherence; classification as "ordering" means giving random data an evaluated ranking. For example, giving a group of arguments a specific structure (like the essay form) is not the same thing as giving them an order (such as "argument #1 is stronger than #2, therefore I will put #1 in the first paragraph", etc.). When we classify people as "fat", "slim", "old", "young" and hope that people will "broaden [their] human tolerance for these differences", this assumes and requires that the language we use to classify is politically neutral. Contrary to "commonsense", it is language that masters us, not the other way around. Language forms the conceptual and logical framework of our thinking, our logic, our consciousness. But of course, language of classification is rarely politically neutral (and certainly not in this case). The language we use to classify people are pregnant with many other meanings, derived from social, cultural and historical context. Therefore, what we cannot help getting is a classification as "ordering", that "fat" people is binarily "bad", whereas "slim", "good". With this fundamental problem, how can we ever move to the goal of embracing multiplicity? The only way to do it is to dissolve (or "deconstruct", break down) the hierarchy by exposing its fundamental structures and assumptions, and work beyond those assumptions. Does that mean categories of "fatness" and "slimness" does not exist? No. They exist, but now they can (at least attempt to) exist outside the ordering system; now they can mean what they are defined to be and nothing else. By saying that "there is only one kind of princess, and Yan-Yee belongs to it", one can break down the hierarchy of categories and say not "Yan-Yee is a fat princess" but rather "Yan-Yee is a princess who happens to be fat". As long as we stay within the ordering system right now without ever questioning it, politically we can never get anywhere.

Perhaps this is why it seems impossible to reach a "cultural equality". The two types of classification are so often mushed together that we can hardly distinguish the difference without some meditation. Capitalism certainly does not aid the cause: we are trained to keep on doing work and not meditate, and when we meditate, we are trained in the ordering logic in our education system. Language, too, itself is so full of connotations that it is difficult to break away from it. But things are beginning to happen: in the academia at least we are trying to be as politically correct as possible. This is a huge and a very important movement towards "cultural equality", for the academia is the institutation that trains future educators and writers.

It is indeed extremely tempting to say that there is no way "in ruminating about these articles, you are going to change the world". If this act is performed only by the academians, then this statement is very true. But if everyone in the world begins to critically examine things that are going on culturally around the world, we might just see a few changes. Changes do not have to be wars and marches. Changes can mean that, for example, the breaking down of stereotypes. Cultural equality is a much more difficult process than a political change. It requires changes to be made in the most fundamental level, meaning language and social consciousness. Changing from one political system to another would not get anyone anywhere if the ways of thinking have not the least altered. The communist movement failed largely because social consciousness is not ready for this political change. Ideas of Enlightenment (such as freedom, equality; ideas we take for granted right now) took over a century for them to be accepted into mainstream social consciousness. We need to alter our way of thinking, changing it from classification of ordering, to that of structuring.

Tristan

PS: By the way, the "Chinatown example" AC brought up is extremely important. Applying my principle above, "Chinatown" in itself is not oppressive. But when the connotations of "Chinatown" are used in a political (by political, I always mean discourses of power) context, then it becomes extremely oppressive. There is always the danger of reducing the many different Chinese-Canadian narratives to that of the Chinatown narrative. Or we can give a much more obvious example. If a woman says "I am a prostitute", the historical, social and cultural connotations of the word "prostitute" will work against that person, even if none of the connotations for that person hold true. On the other hand, if I say "I have an ipod", the connotations of an ipod will give me positive political power, in that (for example) "I am in and I am cool". (That is, afterall, how advertisement campaign works.) If I, who own an ipod, stand beside one who does not have one, the (masculine) gaze of the social consciousness will impose a hierarchy between us. Same thing happens if I stand beside a prostitute. In the court, the prostitute will have less creditabilty in giving evidence than me, precisely because of this. The point, then, is to go beyond that, go beyond ordering and to structuring.

Groundrules for Discussion

Many thanks to the various commenters who have offered their valuable insights into the nature of popular culture (perhaps specifically Hong Kong). I am learning a lot from everyone's view points, in the sense that it is intellectually stimulating. It seems that this is a very engaging issue: already I see each commenter holding his or her own point of view. I most certainly intend to further this discussion. I think there are lots of things to be explored, and a dialogue is always better than a monologue.

If indeed discussions are going to be continued (rather than my usual, traditional monologues or poetic works), I think a few ground rules should be set. I apologize if my ground rules are entirely arbitrary; if you don't agree with them, you do not have to comment on my blog. However, I think it is for the general good and health to all commenters, to ensure that here is a safe space for discussion of various ideas that are intimately related to our daily lives.

The only really important rule I have is Respect: I know AC started out with the whole "get a life" thing, and that sparked a little fire, but I'm sure that was not intentionally offensive. I think we should all respect one another and not attack each other. There are a few comments out there, but I hope that they are now disregarded; from now on all comments are not to contain any kind of offensive personal attacks. I think it is okay to attack someone's ground or opinion given good, intellectual reasons, but certainly there is no need to take a ground and reduce it entirely to the identity of that person. There is a great difference between views and identities. The former can be debated, accepted and rejected; the latter cannot and should not. My apologies to those who are offended: I did not expect this to become a great discussion.

Another thing is, please sign your name (whatever you want to be called) at the end of each comment, and please use the same name. It is just easier to refer back to individuals this way and avoid miscommunication.

Regardless of whether this discussion is going to last or not, I want to thank everyone for their valuable ideas.

Tristan

PS - AC: in some ways I'm happy to not know your identity. I think it gives me a more objective view (whatever that is) into insights. Perhaps you know who I am, and in that case you can probably deduce the assumptions I make in my own arguments. So, nice to meet you!

Dear Anonymous Commenter

Thank you for your insightful comments. Apart from the final sentence, which I find it to be unnecessarily offensive, I think your comments do present another valid point of view. I do, however, believe that there are a few misunderstandings that might cause your anger in my untimely meditation.

Firstly, I do not doubt the genuinity of Jee-Wah's comments; rather my close reading of his speech is to point out how patriarchal assumptions are embedded within Hongkong culture's language, that people unconsciuosnessly say anti-feminist things. They cannot be faulted; on the other hand, it is necessary for them (and us too) to recognize our cultural assumptions and how damaging it can be.

Secondly, specifically to Jee-Wah's comment with regards to the many kinds of princess, I think he is indeed honest in trying to rouse people to their maturity. But his language does not show that: by categorizing you establish a hierarchy, because the categories are constructed by words, and words themselves carry social connotation that a specific culture cannot just get rid of. So when Jee-Wah implies that there are slim princesses and fat princesses, this unconsciously construct the hierarchy of slim over the fat (because of the connotation from culture), and therefore his comment effectively dismisses Yan-Yee as a being who is also entitled to a legitimate (e.g. "slim") endowing of the title "princess". As long as this hierarchy stays, and as long as the connotations of the word "fat" does not change, no matter how open-minded you are, you are still conservative.

Thirdly, your "political" view, in my humble opinion, is far too narrow. "Politics" is not just about George Bush. Politics is about power struggle, and that extends to all groups of people, and all kinds of grouping of people, from class struggle, to philosophical-political (e.g. socialism vs. fascism) struggle, to sexual struggle (gay vs straight, male vs. female), to racial struggle. The Yan-Yee issue has to do with a sexual struggle: this happens because of the all too powerful masculine gaze that imposes itself on the feminine body. It is not just about this trend or that trend, but the underlying structure of all trends. In fact, I would argue that the timely philosophical-political struggle is not as important as a cultural struggle like the one I've talked about - no effective changes can be made if we only focus on the timely, superficial level. This is precisely why the US has not change at all since its constitution: timely politics become such a big part of its culture that no cultural change takes place - capitalism remains the status quo; unquestioning political-religious values remains the status quo; argubly patriarchy remains the status quo. If the status quo remains, then nothing changes, and what good is that? "Politics" is not about going to marches and demonstrations; it is about the spreading of the ideas that are found in the marches and demonstrations, and as a cultural critic I should be spreading ideas by writing them and talking about them. This is hardly gossip about celebrities: this is real, political talk.

Fourthly, I do not like your comment of taking me and generalizing that "Chinese's tendency to be "curious" about entertainment news instead of current events that are happening around the world." I think it is awfully reductive of you to say that. If you are annoyed by my cultural critiques, please tell me why they are annoying. But there is certainly no need to make this kind of comments.

Fifthly, I must have to say that with a deconstructive reading of your comments it reveals the nature of your social, cultural and political background more than anything else. While you suggest me to meditate on "world" issues, I would suggest you to meditate (untimely, that is the key Nietzschean word) on"wordly" issues: issues of power, of structures, of narratives, of sexuality. I have the luxury of not having to worry about dinner tomorrow; I will admit that I come from a middle-class family. Precisely because I have the economic base I am now free to think about these "untimely" things; and I really believe that I should think about them because it would make the world a better place to live: no longer a place of patriarchal oppression, or class struggle, racism, etc. - a world of true cultural equality.

I hope we will continue this discussion, but in a milder tone.

Tristan

Continuing on with the comment on Yan-Yee

Here is the headline of another article that follows up on the Yan-Yee scandal from last week: "Three Week Magazine" giving away Yan-Yee targets gets criticized. Basically the article reports that a magazine in HongKong is giving away poster-targets (that said "the destruction of fairy tales") of Yan-Yee's upper body, with her wearing her Snow White costume. We don't have to worry about the article, apart from the comments of a celebrity who is trying to defend Yan-Yee:
Mr. Jun Gee-Wai believes Yan-Yee is still "A little girl", her will to slim herself is admirable, and should not be picked on anymore, as well there are many kinds of princesses, why should the complaining audience complain?

I have previously mentioned how demented the social consciousness of Hong Kong is; the "Beauty myth" plants itself deep into the consciousness, and the image becomes a source of power. The obsession of the image drives reality away, and now to the point that suggests we ought to kill reality, symbolized by the poster-target of Yan-Yee. This is not about the obsession of the image; rather it is about the obsession of the image. It is the image that is most damaging. By extension, women continue to be subjected to the Beauty Myth, that they must be beautiful because if they are not they will be metaphorically killed by the social gaze.

The comments given by the two celebrities, I would argue, do far more damage than the poster itself (and the poster is pretty bad). Let's read these comments closely:
1. Why do they insist that Yan-Yee is "a little girl"? Does it actually matter? Is it because she is a little girl that she is allow to indulge herself in her absolutely disgust fantasy? What if she is not a little girl? What if she is 25 years old? Would that make her a shame because she does not know that she should conform to the cultural oppression of the female sex, as according to the Beauty Myth, and stay away from cameras?
2. Why is her will to slim herself "admirable"? So she should rigourous conform to the masculine gaze of society?
3. Why is it that she should not be pick on anymore? So when she was a fat little girl (when she was 12, for example), it's perfectly okay to laugh at her obesity?
4. What does Mr. Jun mean when he said "there are many kinds of princesses"? So there is the slim, pretty kind and the fat, ugly kind? Why make a distinction? Is it to place her in a category such that she can be ethically dismissed and therefore pitied?
5. Why does not he say that Yan-Yee is beautiful as any princess if he really supports Yan-Yee? This is, in a way, a decisive moment of Hong Kong culture. I see his comments as the defining moment of how Hong Kong culture sees itself.

I will repeat this is not a little obsession that we can just gloss over and say "oh this is just a little obsession" as if nothing happened. This is a political battlefield, in which the women of Hong Kong has just lost. They are going to be oppressed by their male counter parts for a long time, until that one day when a celebrity can revisit the crisis and say, "oh no, I think she is beautiful the way she is. If you don't see her beauty, then it is your problem."

Comments on a news article

I was just reading the entertainment page of MingPao, and by entertainment it means the news of the Hong Kong entertainment industry. There was a striking headline, which runs something like this:

"Causes disgust" "Scares little kids" Yan-Yee acts as Snow White receives 171 cases of complains.

The rest of the revelant parts of the article runs as follows:

Yesterday the Department of Advertisement Management received 171 cases of complains concerning yesternight's broadcast of "Hong Kong Disney World Opening Celebration" from telephone calls, the main complain is concerning Yan-Yee in the show's acting as Snow White performing various songs and dances, that it "causes discomfort", "causes disgust" and "scares little kids", etc.

Yan-Yee (I forgot her English name) is the daughter of a famous Hong Kong celebrity, who actually is attending UBC in the faculty of Arts (or was it Fine Arts?). For much of her youthful years she has been known to be the "fat baby". Her mother is the "fat lady", and indeed Yan-Yee is quite obese. Recently she had trimmed her body up considerably, and now she actually doesn't look all that bad: while she is definitely not skinny, she is not even close to being obese either. She had actually published a book on her experience from the fat girl to the non-fat one (but I won't get into that). And she is not all that bad looking, although certainly she is no Venus (the Goddess of Love, not the tennis player).

Of course, the really key question here is: why these complains? What is it about her in the show as Snow White that makes her so revolting? Is it because she is a celebrity's daughter, and that people are jealous? Some people, maybe; but that would not trigger the comment "scares little kids". What is it about her as Snow White that might possibly scare little kids?

Well, let's ask another question first, then we will come back to this. What scares little kids? Given in the context of children's literature and entertainment, monsters, witches and evil people scare little kids. In a sense, I think what's happening is that Yan-Yee for some reason does not conform to the general image of Snow White, and because of this distortion, it causes some people to think that she will scare little kids.

This is a very round about way of saying that Yan-Yee is fat. Snow White is not fat. Snow White is not of ordinary looks. And perhaps (subconsciously) Snow White is not Chinese. The wonderful innocent Snow White has been distorted, and of course people find it revolting. A 171 complains is quite a big number; Hong Kong usually don't care to call about things unless it's pretty big, and this case proves to be the big thing.

This sets up a very interesting phenomenon in Hong Kong culture. Innocence is equated with physical beauty. That image makes us all warm and fuzzy and smiley. Yet this is an exact reflection of just how demented the culture has became. People do not at all want to see reality - the reality that there are fat kids, and that there are ugly kids. There is also a kind of Western worship: if Yan-Yee was white, I am convinced that this would not have happened. Hong Kong culture is becoming extremely bipolar: everybody is obssessed with the ideal and strives to be the ideal (like Yan-Yee's body trimming), but everybody is doomed to fail (like Yan-Yee's performance). Yet everyone keeps on trying anyway because the ideal image myth is everywhere: TV, advertisement, posters, etc, and everyone is possessive about these images: any attempt to (un)intentionally change the image is attacked.

Of course, at the end of the day hardly anybody in the world cares about what I've just written. Even I don't care, because I cannot answer the question "so what?" So what if everyone worships this cruel ideal image and lost touch with his or her own bodily reality? We don't have to worry about that, because we can actually and continually change our own bodily reality (plastic surgery and weight lost programs). And so what if there are political (by that, I mean in terms of race, class and sexuality) implications from this (what Naomi Wolf calls) the "Beauty Myth"? Disney World will run on, and so will the Snow White image.

So what now?

In Response to Jenn

Hmm, before I go on I better lay out the entire context of this discussion. Charmaine read the first four cantos of The Chelsiad and gave me the two comments, that while Athena thinks that "God is God because God is Good", it should be "God is Good because God is God". (So these two statements are not even my words!) Charmaine herself is confused about what she is trying to say, but these words were said, and I've decided to think of them as texts and trying to see construction of meaning. (May I add here that the debate between Jesus and Athena in the poem is my "stage" for exploring theological issues; neither Jesus nor Athena represents solely my viewpoint, although admittedly I must say I identity with Athena more in terms of my curiousity to know these issues.)

Basically, this logical analysis would be an extension to Athena's view point, her attempt to understand Christian theology. We met up the next day and talked more about this; what Charmaine is trying to say is that, from a Christian point of view, it is senseless to define what God "is". The previous night she quoted a section from the Exodus, in which Moses asks God what he should tell his people if he is ask to whom Moses is talking to, and God said "I am". The statement God is God has to be not because of any kind of logical structure, as Jenn you correctly pointed out; any Christian would say a purely logical analysis of God is absurd. God asks Moses to say "I am" to the people because, in my humble opinion, that is as close as the full presence of Being (taken in both the "metaphysical manifestation" and the Heideggerian senses) as possible. Had Moses say something like "God", or "Lord", etc, he will launch himself into a web of language, which is a constant deferring of meaning (all definitions are made up of other words, which would require other definitions). He must say "I am" in order to be true to God's intend, and in order for the establishment of transcendental faith. Charmaine's statement of "God is Good because God is God" is in one sense a paraphrasing of this belief (although rather awkwardly done). God cannot be defined, since that means one is not only restricting God (even if you say He has "infinite power", etc), but one is also constructing God in the act of definition, limting His be-ing (presence) to a mere word, and from a Christian's point of view, I cannot imagine this to be something desirable.

That is a response to Jenn your first comment. But then you went on to dissect my logical analysis with your second comment, which I find extremely interesting and challenging. And that is good: it is a kind of intellectual rigour lacking from most people these days; too often we have lapsed into an uncaring mode. (My father drily comments that the two statements mean the exact same thing.)

Perhaps it is better if I lay out all the original statements again, with different numberings, so it is easier to follow my examination.
1. God is God because God is Good.
2. God is Good because God is God.
3. Because God is Good, therefore God is God.
4. Because God is God, therefore God is Good.
5. Because apple is sweet, therefore apple is apple.
6. Because apple is apple, therefore apple is sweet.
7. Apple is sweet, therefore it is an apple (direct causality). Something is sweet. Something must be an apple?

S(tatement) 3 is a paraphrase of S1; S4 of S2. S5 and S6 have the same logical structure as 3 and 4. S7, which is a proper argument, is your rendition of S5.

One thing I should point out is that, while something can be causal, it doesn't make it an argument (which is syllogistic). I would argue that S7 is an incorrect rendition of S5. You are absolutely correct in saying that "sweetness" is the essence of "apple", just as in the poem Jesus explains to Athena that "Goodness" is the essence of a "God". S7, however, follows to commit a fallacy by adding "Something must be an apple". The words "must be" does not come from S5. "Apple" is defined by "sweetness", but not vice versa; if "it" is not sweet, "it" cannot be an apple; if "it" is sweet, it doesn't follow that "it" is necessarily an apple. That is all S5 means, and nothing else. It is Goodness that defines God; if Ares is not Good, then Ares is not God. If God is Good, then God is God.

The problem the above explanation brings up is this: God is no longer the primary term in the causal chain. He is limited by Goodness, since it is Goodness that causes his identity. Where did Goodness come from? If Goodness comes from God, then we have a circular argument, right? Not quite. In order to resolve that dilema, we need to make the distinction between Goodness as a law, and Goodness as an action. What must happen is that God needs to define Goodness first as a law, then all his actions have to follow that law. So there is Goodness (which becomes the primary term in the causal chain), but it is a logical possibility for God to act evil. (God, too, has free will and hence evil is a logical possibility that cannot be denied to Him.)

The other objection raised is that "if you say 'goodness causes/makes God', then if you are good enough you'll be God." That is indeed the logical outcome of S1. (This makes sense if you look at it from Athena's point of view: the Grecian gods are not really gods because they are not Good, or Powerful, or Merciful enough. There is no other way in which the Grecian gods can understand the overwhelming be-ing of God, which is meta-natural.) But Goodness (as a law) is a divine, meta-natural definition; how can a non-divine and natural being achieve Goodness? The difference between Goodness and goodness is that of the cosmic scale: goodness is for human beings and natural deities, while Goodness is for God.

*This is very demanding of my intellect, extremely stimulating, for it forces me to be extremely careful about language and the (mis)construction of meaning. It also forces me to consider about religion and metaphysics carefully.*

God and Good

After reading my mock epic, The Chelsiad, a friend commented that while I presented the view "God is God because God is Good", she thinks that the truer view is "God is Good because God is God." Surely, there is a very subtle difference between the statements, and it took me about an hour of meditation (before my sleep) before I really figured out what is going on. (Or at least I hope I understand what's going on; I now apologize for whatever misinterpretation I am going to give.)

"God is God because God is Good" means that God is who he is because he has the property of Goodness. Goodness defines God. God is a "thing", and "Good" is a property attached to this "thing".

"God is Good because God is God", on the other hand, means that whatever God does He is Good. If God does not do Good, He would not be God. Goodness, then, is defined by God. This means that God is what he does, which is Good.

The problem with the latter statement is that it is a fallacy. "God is God" in itself is a meaningless statement, since it is a tautology, just like "apple is apple". It does not offer any definition or identity. "God is Good", on the other hand, is a definition. Hence, in the first case, saying a definition causes an identity is fine; Goodness makes something God, and hence if you don't have Goodness, you cannot be God. But in the latter case, using an empty tautology to cause a definition is a fallacy. "God is God" cannot logically and possibly cause the proposition "God is Good" unless you have already defined God is Good, which makes the latter statement circular.

Put the two statements this way, and we will see the difference:
1. Because God is Good, therefore God is God.
2. Because God is God, therefore God is Good.

Or

1. Because apple is sweet, therefore apple is apple.
2. Because apple is apple, therefore apple is sweet.

Clearly, the second instance does not really work.

What is "Common Knowledge"?

Recently a MingPao columnist posted a 1953 Elementary School Common Knowledge Examination. Here are some sample questions from that exam:
1. What kind of country is Sparta and Athens?
2. Describe the origin of the French Revolution.
3. a. Where are the typhoons region? b. How are deserts formed?
4. Try to compare the farm techniques of China and United States.
5. When is the United Nations formed? Where is the headquarter? What should the United Nations do to achieve "globalization"?
6. Why should a government tax its citizens?
7. Use a diagram with words to describe how the tides work.
8. List out all the vitamins and its functions.

My dad and I had an argument about this. He suggested that by reading these exam questions this is just how smart the people back then are. My argument is that this is hardly common knowledge; for me, it is unimaginable that most grade 6 kids would know the answer to these questions. My father then said he has a friend, who is so smart, that by grade 4 he memorized all of China's history. I countered that that is only him: we are talking about "common knowledge" here. I asked him if he knows where Sparta is. He said it's in Africa. I then pointed out that Sparta is definitely not in Africa - if he is a common man, and he doesn't know where Sparta is, then how in the world is that question a "common knowledge"? (And I'm not just picking on the particular; he doesn't know most of the questions apart from the economic ones.) What is "common knowledge" is by definition common among the people within a historical context. "Fire is hot" is common knowledge; "Li Bai is a great poet" is common Chinese knowledge. The eight questions above are basically specialized knowledge. My father argues that all of these questions are discussed everywhere (in newspaper, on the radio, taught in school); if one pays attention to things around him/herself, one would know the answer. This, however, assumes that one's source of knowledge is actually correct and reliable. But given the Hongkong cultural context, why would question #1-4, 7 and 8 be discussed at all in sources, and why would question #5 and 6's answers be reliable (since they are bound to be ideological and therefore manipulative)? Hence how can these be considered as "common knowledge"?

What is the point of all this? The point is one should be careful about using the term "common knowledge" because it is all too easy to take something specialized as "common" and dismiss those who cannot answer "common" questions on the ground of their "ignorance". Somebody who can do very well on Jeopardy isn't exactly someone who is very analytical and smart either. Having these "common" knowledge does not mean a thing: frankly nobody cares the origin of the French Revolution; what matters is that you have things to support what you say. This means not only "what is the origin of the French Revolution?", but also "why is it the origin of the French Revolution?" From that perspective, we can clearly see that this is not "common" knowledge, but something very specialized.

One should always be careful with a term like "common knowledge": to whom is this common? And why are they common? The common implies the uncommon, just as narratives imply silences. So is a question like "how does the devaluation of the Chinese currency affect the economy of HongKong?" common knowledge in the 21st century HongKong context? My dad argues that it is, because it is talked about everywhere, from TV shows, to newspapers and magazine. But I would argue that that is not common knowledge: ask the common housewife, the old man in the park playing chess, the school students, the engineering major, and I suspect that one would find that the majority of the people would not know the answer. (Or perhaps I really lack the imagination of believing that all those people all know the answer; I certainly don't know the answer.) But how easily my dad dismissed me as a stubborn academian when he found out that I have no such "common knowledge". (I gave an answer and he gave me a 6.5 out of 10, whatever that means.) I rebutted back that he thought a large object would fall faster than a smaller one! ("It's common sense!" he said. I proved him wrong on the spot by dropping an orange and a penny.)

It is not common, I must say, for any two people to agree on what exactly is "Common knowledge". And because of that, just as I am a stubboran academican, so my dad is an academically-retarded capitalist.

Tips

Today I went to eat dinner at a typical Chinese diner, and I mistakenly gave them only 50 cents for a $22.50 meal. What happened was I gave them $30, then they gave like $8.50 back in change. I took $7, thinking I gave them $1.50 in tips; but when I got home I realized that that was definitely not the case. Why didn't they just give $7.50 in change? I would have just taken the $5 bill. I don't think they will like me very much now.

On the other hand, I don't think they liked me any extra last time when I gave them 15% tips, so...now we are even?

School's Starting Again

Hmm...what of that? I'll be doing the exact same thing, with the exception of steady meal time and less amount of sleep.

Wozzeck

I've just finished watching Alban Berg's opera Wozzeck, and I think my musical horizon has just been stretched a hundred times. This is the only atonal opera I have watched (there are very few atonal operas out there anyway), and it completely erases all the prejudices I had against atonal music before. Here is a list of previous prejudices and my current opinions:

1. Atonal music is incomprehensivable - this is true only if you do not "listen". The opera, which is a marriage of words and music, forces the listener to listen when there are no words, forces the listener to understand the scene without resorting to lingustic means. The music isolated from the words in Berg's opera is absolutely amazing; no longer is one hooked onto the traditional musical aspect of conventional harmony. In Berg's opera, everything matters. it is not just about harmony and resolution; melodic curve, dissonances, rhythms, syncipation, etc all contribute to the power of the music. The near-tonal Mahlerian melody nearing the end of the opera is even more powerful in the general atonal and dissolutional context.
2. Atonal music is boring - this is only because one does not understand and listen the strange musical language. If one understands the music, then the music is no longer boring.
3. Atonal music works only for psychological scenes - ultimately it is all about the imagination of the composer. Alban Berg uses atonality to country songs, waltzes and lullabies, and they work surprisingly well.
4. Richard Strauss is the triumph of the opera form - Strauss was good, taking Wagnerian opera up a notch; but Berg is even better, taking all that Strauss developped, adding Schoenberg's atonality, mixing that up with Expressionism to create a very powerful opera.
5. Atonal music sounds like noise - again, this is true only if one is not listening.

Now I want to watch Schoenberg's Moses und Aaron and Berg's Lulu.